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Abstract 
 Over the past 70 years civil wars have become the most common form of war. 
Much time and thought has been devoted to understand why subnational groups fight. 
Additionally, scholars have long analyzed the so-called “resource curse”, whereby states 
with high levels of natural resources may tend to experience violence. As levels of 
globalized economic markets have proliferated in this time too, it is important to 
understand the relationship between foreign investment and war. Little research has been 
done on the interaction between resource extraction, foreign investment, and subnational 
conflict, especially using social identity formation as an analytical tool. This study 
identifies social identity formation as a possible causal mechanism of ethnic conflict and 
assesses whether foreign direct investment in resource extraction leads to conflict via 
such a mechanism. This study uses a qualitative case study to argue that this mechanism 
is at play in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region and then attempts to show that the same 
relationship may also exist globally using large-N quantitative data. 
 
Introduction  
In the 1950s oil was discovered in Nigeria. Since then multi-national corporations 
(MNCs) have descended on the Niger Delta regions, which contain most of the oil in the 
country. The foreign investments in oil extraction have brought unprecedented wealth to 
the country, although the resulting oil rents have exacerbated inequality across and within 
its regions.  While Nigeria has seen oil rents regularly compose over a tenth of its annual 
GDP, Nigeria’s oil-rich regions have been economically and environmentally decimated 
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with far-reaching consequences for the regions’ ethnic minority groups, notably the 
Ogoni and Ijaw. In the last 30 years, the oil-rich regions have become completely 
militarized by ethnic militias and government militaries fighting over oil production and 
thousands of lives have been lost to violence. Sadly, Nigeria's history is not unique; 
examples of resource-fueled subnational wars abound.  
In fact, over the past 70 years civil wars have become the most common form of 
war. It is then imperative that we better understand how and why wars between 
subnational groups are fought. As expected, much time and thought has been devoted to 
develop our understandings of the various causes of subnational wars. Many scholars 
have focused on distinguishing types of subnational wars for further study (Sambanis, 
2001), since different types of war in different contexts may have different causes. This 
paper aims to examine one type of civil wars identified in the literature, ethnic or 
identity-based wars, and how foreign direct investment (FDI) in resource extractionary 
industries (REFDI) may play a role, as it seems to have in Nigeria. 
Drawing on existing literature and empirical results that evidence social 
identification and political exclusion of politically relevant ethnic groups as key 
mechanisms and determinants for ethnic wars, respectively, I attempt to evidence short-
term relationships between increases in REFDI and ethnic war via mechanisms of social 
identification. Given that ethnic demography, political representation of ethnic groups, 
and levels of economic development vary tremendously across countries, and that 
resource extractionary development has been associated with subnational conflict, this 
study will aim to examine how ethno-political marginalization and REFDI can combine 
to increase risk of ethnic conflict via mechanisms of social identification.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: I review the existing literature and 
parse previously theorized causal mechanisms. Next I introduce a formal model of 
identity formation created by Sambanis and Shayo (2013), and use the model to develop 
intuition on the possible contextualized effects of REFDI on social identity and conflict. I 
then illustrate how REFDI contributed to ethnic conflict in Nigeria using existing studies 
and articles. After demonstrating these processes in Nigeria I analyze large-N economic 
and political data to show that the same processes apparent in Nigeria may also exist 
around the world. Do to a lack of satisfactory data on REFDI I use a rough proxy detailed 
below. I conclude by assessing the results given the available quantitative data and point 
to new avenues of inquiry. 
 
Existing Literature 
While many scholars have focused on economic determinants of civil war, the 
literature on identity-based conflict has identified, in addition to economic determinants, 
affective and political factors that lead people to fight (notably, Sambanis, 2001; Wood, 
2003; Cederman et al. 2010). Additionally, scholars have long analyzed the so-called 
“resource curse”, whereby states with high levels of valuable natural resources such as 
petroleum or alluvial diamonds tend to see more violent conflict. Asal et al. (2013), show 
that while oil alone may not dramatically increase the chances of ethnic conflict, when 
ethnic groups are politically excluded from central executive state power and live in 
geographically concentrated regions, the presence of oil in these regions increases the 
chances of conflict.  
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As levels of globalized economic markets have proliferated in this time too, it is 
important to understand the interactions between globalization on war, especially at a 
subnational level. Many empirical studies as well as surveys of corporate officers of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) show that firms choose to invest in countries where 
political instability and thus investment risk is low (Pierpont, 2005; Global Investment 
Competitiveness Report, World Bank Group, 2018). This leads to a negative correlation 
between conflict and FDI. Less research, however, examines the reciprocal effects of FDI 
on the risks for political instability, corruption, and subnational violence and the results 
have been mixed and largely ignore ethnic conflict as a factor in violence (Gissinger and 
Gleditsch, 1999; Barbieri and Reuveny, 2005; Robertson and Watson, 2004). Since 
MNCs aim to invest in countries with lower risk, any empirical analysis of a causal 
relationship between REFDI and conflict or vice versa must account for endogeneity 
bias. This paper aims to use a qualitative case study of Nigeria to trace causal pathways 
from REFDI to ethnic violence as a means of demonstrating one way in which REFDI 
can affect violence. 
For context, I present a few graphs that demonstrate the existing economic 
conditions and levels of ethnic violence over the past few decades. As seen in the graph 
of Economic Indicators from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 
2010), FDI and Oil Rents as a percent of each country’s GDP (averaged across countries 
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by year) have risen in recent years. 
 
Notably, Mineral rents have not risen, which I address later. Additionally, I 
present a graph of Ethnic Wars, representing the proportion of countries in a given year 
experiencing either at least one new ethnic war onset or an ongoing war, using the same 
data as Asal et al. (2016) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program on ethnic wars. I 
explain the precise definitions of such wars later. While fewer countries experience 
ongoing ethnic wars since just after the Cold War and Soviet breakup, the proportion of 
countries at war remains high and the proportion of countries experiencing new ethnic 
war onsets remains relatively high. 
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Clearly, in an increasingly globalized world we have not figured out how to end 
subnational and ethnic violence. We have, however, made big steps in identifying and 
evaluating possible causes in the literature. 
 
Literature on ethnic conflict:  
Early accounts of civil war focused on primordial, deep-seated antipathies 
between groups to account for irrational violence. Around the turn of the 
21st century, researchers began to identify economic mechanisms to explain sub-national 
conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) (henceforth CH), explained participation in civil war 
as a rational economic decision informed by available loot from the spoils of war. 
Similarly, Fearon and Laitin (2003) (henceforth FL) proposed that individuals participate 
in sub-national violence based on a rational decision weighing the costs of rebellion 
(affected by state strength) against group-based grievances. In this account, opportunity 
structures feature prominently in predicting rebellion. These seminal works pushed other 
researchers to examine underlying nuances in these studies, particularly in defining 
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independent and dependent variables, evaluating the legitimacy of different proxies for 
such variables, and illuminating various causal pathways between independent and 
dependent variables. For example, how do we measure the onset of a civil war? Do we 
define civil wars differently if groups make ethnically defined claims, and fight as 
ethnically defined groups? What if the civil war results from an elite coup? What if the 
war takes place in a democratic country as opposed to an authoritarian regime? What if 
international actors play a role?  
  
The results of these inquiries have led to a few understandings. While CH and FL 
downplayed the role of ethnicity in their studies, Sambanis (2001), Cederman et al. 
(2010), Wegenast and Basedau (2014), and numerous other studies find that while ethnic 
identification may not be a necessary condition for civil war, some degree of ethnic 
identification and ethnic variance within a country can affect the chances of ethnic civil 
wars. Sambanis (2001) argues that unlike non-ethnic wars in which economic opportunity 
factors heavily, in ethnic wars, political grievances of ethnic groups predominantly cause 
ethnic wars. Cederman et al. (2010), using disaggregated group-level data, further 
evidence the importance of ethnicity, finding that ethnic groups that are excluded from 
central executive state power, especially having experienced a recent downgrade in 
power, tend to fight more. Cederman et al. (2010), however, also find that mobilizational 
capacity and histories of violence do matter in predicting conflict. Numerous political 
science, behavioral economic, and psychology studies have highlighted the importance of 
individual identification with a group for collective action (Littman and Paluck, 2015; 
Wood, 2003; Hale, 2004; Chandra, 2006; Charnysh et al., 2015; Reicher et al., 2008), 
 10 
although many of these ascribe different mechanisms for the importance of identity for 
action. Such mechanisms include reducing information asymmetries, establishing norms, 
common in-group identity models (CIIM), and more, and will be discussed in the 
mechanisms section.   
  
As noted in the introduction, researchers have also examined links between 
resource wealth, FDI, and conflict.  CH argue that an increase in resource wealth 
incentivizes materially focused groups to loot. FL, however, argue that if a state is able to 
strengthen itself from its resource wealth then it can better prevent conflict. Clearly, these 
two arguments point in opposite causal directions. Both effects may likely exist to 
differing degrees in different contexts. Tomashevskiy (2016) creates a formal economic 
model that shows how foreign investors and authoritarian leaders can use investment 
inflows to reduce incentives for political elites to launch coups.  Meanwhile, Roy (2018) 
argues that while easily lootable natural resources increase incentives to fight, politically 
inclusive institutions can limit these conflict-inducing effects.  
Focusing on the individual level, a new study by Steven Liao presented at the 
“Immigration: Research Frontiers and Policy Challenges Conference” (October, 2019) 
argues that increases in foreign investment in the US housing market by Chinese 
international students decreases anti-immigration bias amongst locals due 
to sociotropic economic interests. While this context differs dramatically from REFDI in 
developing countries, it shows that some types of FDI may help decrease out-group bias. 
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Importantly, some studies have focused on the effects of natural resources and/or 
FDI interacting with ethnic identities. Notably, Asal et al. (2016) argue that “Ethnic 
groups subject to exclusion whose settlement area includes oil wealth are more likely to 
experience the onset of armed conflict than groups experiencing exclusion alone” based 
on a large-N statistical analysis (1343). Wegenast and Basedau (2014) find evidence that 
salience-based ethnic fractionalization is associated with higher conflict onset risk, and 
“that oil further increases the conflict potential within fractionalized countries” 
(431). Sorens (2011), however, argues that the presence of lootable resources should not 
increase chances of ethnic-based coups because looting has negative externalities on the 
rest of the group. Sorens finds that among geographically concentrated ethnic groups in 
peripheral regions of states, increasing values of mineral resource wealth increase 
chances of autonomist rebellions and decrease chances of rebellions that aim to control 
central power, and that rebels do not loot from their own constituencies. Sorens, however, 
uses a data set of secessionist movements from Walter (2006) that has since been 
repudiated as imprecise and misleading (Sambanis et al., 2017).   
Meanwhile, Aspinall (2007), in a qualitative examination of processes leading to 
conflict in Indonesian regions argues that the combination of ethnically salient politics 
and resource wealth in the Aceh region ultimately led to conflict. Aspinall argues that 
a legacy of past conflict, state institutionalization of ethnicity, and elite agency in 
constructing discourse allowed oil resources to be interpreted as ethnic grievances, 
facilitating violence. The wealth of (often conflicting) research has generated multiple 
theoretical mechanisms linking ethnicity, resources and foreign investment to conflict. In 
the next section I articulate these mechanisms.  
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Causal Mechanisms  
Various causal mechanisms have been theorized to explain sub-national conflict. Here I 
identify those associated with ethnic wars, i.e. those in which individual identity 
matters. Under an instrumentalist conception of identity, individuals can easily choose 
and switch their identities based on rational decisions. Under Primordialist conceptions, 
individuals have deep-rooted fixed identities and natural antagonisms toward out-groups. 
Under Constructivist theories of social identity, individuals may choose from an available 
set of identities based on rational decision making, however identities are sticky, and 
switching is psychologically costly and rare (Shayo, 2007). Some of the following 
mechanisms can apply under each or some of these conceptualizations of identity.  
  
Material Greed for Loot (Booty Futures):  
This mechanism highlights the rational incentive individuals face to engage in violence to 
control state resources and/or secede from a state to control a region’s resources 
completely. CH highlights this method, although numerous studies such as Humphreys 
(2005), and Aspinall (2007) argue that material greed cannot account for large-scale 
rebellions, while other studies mentioned find that material greed is negligible in 
ethnically defined wars. 
  
Low (Material) Cost for Violence via Weak States  
Here, rebel groups choose to rebel when the cost of violence is low due to weak state 
capacity. FL champions this mechanism (among others), although they use GDP/capita as 
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a proxy for state capacity, a potentially misleading estimator. While GDP/capita 
correlates with decreased conflict in many studies, attributing this correlation to the 
weak states mechanism may be spurious. Humphreys (2005) finds evidence that conflict 
is more likely in weaker states (proxied by other estimators), although a social-identity 
construction mechanism (below) can also account for this result.  
  
Low (Material) Opportunity Cost for Violence  
Here, individuals participate in violence because their opportunity costs are so low that 
violence is rational. Here, economic development, education, employment, or other 
economic factors are so dismal that individuals might as well participate. Economic 
determinants (such as GDP/capita) have been correlated with decreasing conflict (as 
mentioned above), although these correlations may not imply causal mechanisms.  
  
Information Asymmetries in Wealth Distribution   
Here, conflict results because rebel groups face information asymmetries in regard to 
potential resource rents under state control. Since governments can obscure profits from 
resource extraction rebels may not be able to accurately assess the material costs and 
benefits of rebellion without actual control over extraction, thus making nonviolent 
negotiation over rents impossible. The only way for groups to know if they are fairly 
compensated for resources in their region may be to acquire control over those resources 
through violence.  Numerous studies site the possibility of this in exacerbating conflict, 
but testing for a lack of knowledge proves methodologically challenging. 
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Political and/or Material Grievances  
Here, individuals rebel because they perceive political or material grievances for 
themselves and their groups. I combine political and material grievances here because 
unequal political power may determine unequal economic development. I.e. material 
grievances may be the result of political exclusion, a political grievance. In other cases, 
political power may result from economic power, in which case the causal sign is flipped. 
It is of more use to consider whether some form of grievance per se causes individuals to 
commit violence. Cederman et al. (2010) and Asal et al. (2016) provide evidence for this 
mechanism by showing a correlation between political exclusion and conflict. This 
mechanism is distinguished from “greed”, because the greed mechanism focuses on 
future loot, while grievances focus on past inequalities. Kalin and Sambanis (2018), 
however, argue that the desire for political or economic benefits can encompass both of 
these mechanisms, and that the differences in these mechanisms, as well as the 
opportunity cost mechanism, are negligible. 
  
Social-identity Construction  
Here, political and material circumstances (including histories of violence) influence how 
an individual identifies, which in turn determines the rational level of violence to commit. 
Here, individuals can choose from a fixed set of identities to maximize utility. This 
mechanism is based on micro-evidence in social psychology, behavioral economics, and 
political science (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013; Kalin and Sambanis, 2018; Wood, 2003). 
Under this mechanism, weak state institutions may contribute to violence less because 
they have lower capacity to quell violence, but because weaker states may not have 
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infiltrative bureaucracies, social programs, and development programs that could boost 
national status and national identification and thus decrease violence.   
  
Exploring Social Identity Formation (SS13)  
Nicholas Sambanis and Moses Shayo in "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict" 
(2013) (henceforth SS13) formalize a theory of ethnic identification and ethnic conflict 
that endogenizes violence in a constructivist process of social identification. They draw 
on micro-evidence in psychology, behavioral economics and political science to model 
determinants of ethnic identification. Notably, their model introduces the possibility of 
identity equilibria, in which identities and fighting efforts are balanced given different 
contexts. Under this model, individuals have a set of identities from which they can 
identify, some being sub-national communities, or ethnic groups, and one being a 
national group (some weighted union of all sub-national groups). Individuals consider 
their perceived levels of similarities with group members as well as groups' relative 
statuses, and then choose an identity. Based on existing evidence, they assume that:   
  
1. Individuals that perceive themselves to be more similar to a group, A, than to a 
group, B, are more likely to identify with group A.   
2. Individuals care about the status of groups (defined by material wealth and 
exogenous socio-political, historical factors), and would rather both identify with a 
group of higher status and that the group with which they identify increase in status.  
3. Inter-ethnic fighting effort increases the salience of ethnic attributes in 
determining perceived similarity to groups.   
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Increased violence can push individuals to identify ethnically, and individuals choose 
levels of violence based on their identities. Therefore, violence is endogenous to identity 
and vice versa. In the next section I show how the SS13 model can develop intuition for 
how REFDI may affect violence and identity equilibria.  
  
REFDI Effects in Light of SS13:  
Here I describe mathematically defined relationships between variables in SS13, and 
relate them to how REFDI may affect those variables. Afterwards, I show how fighting 
and identity equilibria in SS13 may change according to changes in the variables.  
  
1. Individuals hold defining characteristics such as language, region of residence, 
region of origin, religion, and skin pigmentation, although there are theoretically 
limitless characteristics. Individuals are socialized in a given context to recognize a 
set of typical shared characteristics as categorizing a group (be it a nation, ethnic 
group, or other social group). Therefore, individuals will place different emphases on 
different characteristics across social contexts. For example, an American’s country 
of origin may matter less than the color of their skin in determining their racial group 
as socially constructed by their society.  
2. An individual will perceive himself to be closer to (or farther from) a group if his 
characteristics align more (or less) closely with the median characteristics of the 
group across members. In other words, the distance an individual perceives between 
himself and a group increases as the median characteristics of the group become less 
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similar to his own. Since ethnic groups may be subsections of more diverse national 
groups, an individual may likely feel less distance to an ethnic group than to a nation. 
Additionally, inter-group violence will increase the weight an individual places on 
group characteristics. (I.e. violence increases the saliency of group characteristics in 
determining distance.) Violence then makes it more costly to identify with a group 
that one perceives as distant. 
3. Individuals perceive a nation group, N, and social group, A to have status, which 
increases with material wealth, especially relative to other groups. Exogenous socio-
political and historical factors also influence perceived status. For example, when 
Israel won the 1967 War in six days, many Israelis felt more proud of their national 
identity because the symbolism of defeating historical enemies increased Israel’s 
status. 
a. Importantly, an increase in REFDI to N is an increase in N’s GDP and is 
intended to spur economic development which may further increase N’s GDP. 
This will increase the status of N. Under SS13, political dynamics in the state 
are not modeled, and increases in material wealth to N benefit all subnational 
groups equally. Extending SS13, if political exclusion of group A results in 
less economic development for group A compared to other subnational 
groups, then the status of A may decrease even though the overall status of N 
increases.  
4. In equilibrium, an individual will choose to identify with N instead of A if the 
status of N minus the status of A outweighs his perceived distance to N minus his 
perceived distance to A. The difference in status may outweigh the difference in 
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distance because of the magnitudes of difference, or because the individual cares 
more about status than perceived distance. In other words the relative saliences of 
status and perceived distance can differ.  
5. An individual will choose to identify with A if the above condition is flipped.  
6. It is possible for an individual’s perceived distant from a national group to be so 
great, or the saliency of distance to be so great, that it is almost impossible for him to 
identify nationally. For example it is conceivable that a Palestinian citizen of Israel 
would never identify nationally because that individual may feel too distant from the 
socially constructed Israeli identity. 
  
Under SS13, members of A fight over shares of N’s contestable resources, V, 
with another sub-national group, B. Fighting, however, decreases available V (by using 
resources), which subsequently decreases the status of N. Individuals choose to commit 
fighting resources, F, based on their chosen identities. Individuals who identify with N 
choose to commit very little resources to fighting because that would decrease the status 
of their group. Thus, all else equal, the more fighting there is in a country, the less likely 
an individual is to identify with N, and the more likely they are to continue fighting, 
resulting in identity-fighting equilibria.  
According to the model, if an individual under equilibrium identifies with N 
instead of A or B, then F decreases as the salience of group status increases. If an 
individual under equilibrium identifies with A, or B, then F will increase as the salience 
of group status increases, because the more they fight the more of V they can control. 
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Under both equilibria, F increases with V. If V is easily contestable then this 
effect increases. In the context of natural resources, individuals fight over control of 
resource rent distribution. REFDI provides quick cash injections through royalties and 
production sharing agreements as well as later cash through income taxes, conceptualized 
as increases in easily contestable V (Moran). REFDI revenues can be contested 
differently in different political contexts, either through legitimate means such as 
legislation over budget allocation, or through elite corruption at the national or local 
levels. Below are different scenarios of how REFDI could affect various identity 
equilibria:  
  
1. Let nation, N, have moderate to low status but not a lot of violence, F, with 
subnational groups A and B. Assume that the group statuses of A and B are very low. 
This is essentially why there is little fighting, because individuals do not have a lot of 
incentive to identify strongly with A or B instead of the nation, N. Thus there exists 
the identity equilibrium such that individuals identify with N. Now introduce an 
increase in REFDI. The increase in investment rents takes the form of a large 
immediate increase in contestable resources, V, which also increases national status. 
Even under national identification this increase in V can increase fighting. An 
increase in fighting could increase the salience of group characteristics even more, 
posing the potential to increase ethnic identification. This shift in identification 
should be easy considering N’s moderate to low status. 
2. Now let nation N have low status and a history of political exclusion of ethnic 
group A, but little violence because there are few resources over which to fight (a 
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reasonable assumption given N’s low status). This means that the salience of group 
characteristics must be high, as political exclusion is defined by such characteristics. 
An increase in REFDI in this country may drastically increase violence, since 
individuals are already in an ethnic group identity equilibrium.  
3. Now, assume moderate national status and allow heterogeneous identification 
within groups, where some members of group A feel much closer to A than to N. The 
rest of the country identifies with N. The “radical” A members cannot switch their 
identity to the nation (in line with “sticky” constructivist models of 
identity; Shayo, 2007), and must continue to identify ethnically and care primarily 
about the status of group A regardless of exogenous shocks. Here, an increase in 
REFDI increases V, and increases the optimal F of these “radical” A’s regardless of 
whether the increase in REFDI was enough to substantially increase F among other 
individuals. The increase in V among radicals, however, increases the cost of 
identifying with the nation for the rest of individuals with group A characteristics, 
leading to a new equilibrium where most members with group A characteristics 
identify with A. Fighting increases.  
4. In this scenario, as in scenario 3, assume moderate national status and 
heterogeneous identification within groups. Allow for REFDI to increase V as before, 
but disproportionately degrades the productive capacity of the land on which most of 
group A lives. Some less “radical” individuals who choose to identify with N (but 
could identify with A) move away to other parts of the country for better economic 
opportunities, but the more radical A’s find it hard to move (maybe they only speak 
group A’s language). Here the status of group A decreases as its productive capacity 
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falls vis-à-vis other groups, and radical A’s increase F to capture more V. As in 
scenario 3, this alters identity equilibria for potential A members and ethnic 
identification and fighting increase. 
Below is a table summarizing the various possible scenarios, where I represents 
identification, S represents status; V, contestable resources; F, allocated fighting 
resources; and subscripts A, B and N represent groups A, B, and the Nation, respectively. 
Scenario Initial 
Conditions 
Exogenous 
shock from 
REFDI 
Initial Change Secondary 
Change 
New 
Equilibrium 
1. IN, 
Low SN 
Increase V Increase FA,B Increase IA,B 
Decrease IN 
Increased 
fighting and 
ethnic 
Identification 
2. IA,B, 
Low SN 
Increase V Increase FA,B  Increased 
fighting 
3. IN,A(radicals) 
Moderate SN 
Increase V Increase 
FA(radicals) 
Decrease IN, 
Increase IA 
Increased 
fighting and 
ethnic 
Identification 
4. IN,A 
Moderate SN 
Increase V, 
Decrease SA 
Increase IN, 
Decrease IA, 
Increase 
FA(radicals) 
Increase IA Increased 
fighting and 
ethnic 
Identification 
  
 
Thus, the material effects of REFDI pose the potential for increases in ethnic 
identification and increased violence in multiple contexts.   
  
Abstracting from the narrow results of SS13, it is important to consider how 
REFDI allows actors to manipulate resource rents to change group status and levels of 
contestable resources. Let's say that a country in which most people identify ethnically 
receives an increase in REFDI from an MNC. The country could choose to distribute 
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rents to group A, increasing the status of group A vis-a-vis other groups. This may enrage 
members of other groups who value their own group status and encourage violence to 
capture control over rents. 
Alternatively, let’s say the state wants to avoid violence. The state could equally 
distribute rents among its various sub-national ethnic groups to spur economic 
development, raising the overall status of the nation as a whole without changing the 
relative statuses of subnational groups. This is most similar to how countrywide increases 
in V affect status in SS13. This would incentivize national identification and less 
violence. This could work, however if ethnic identification is high a priori, then different 
groups might still fight over the proportions of rents distributed to each group. 
In a democracy, equal distribution could undermine an elected official's 
constituent support because said official could be seen to be giving resources to an out-
group, reneging on perceived patronage norms existent in many democracies. In weak 
states, corruption could mean that there is not even the opportunity for rents to make their 
way down to real development projects at all.   
Tomashevskiy (2016) shows that authoritarian leaders must pay off political elites 
in order to retain control after FDI. In a state where elite membership is ethnically 
defined, giving money to an excluded group diverts available rents from co-ethnic elites, 
increasing chances of a coup. Thus, there may exist incentives for an authoritarian leader 
to not distribute rents equally to different ethnic groups, or even at all. Given numerous 
information asymmetries between the state and excluded groups surrounding REFDI 
profits as well as information asymmetries surrounding fighting potential, out-group 
members could respond with increased F even if elites do aim to distribute rents equally. 
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If REFDI and group A are geographically concentrated in the same region, that 
alone could increase the perceived distance between A and the nation, incentivizing F. 
Additionally, if the REFDI (such as oil extraction) would cause environmental 
degradation or other decreases in group A status, then members of group A might oppose 
the REFDI altogether, or would demand even more resource rents as compensation.  
 
 As a result of this reasoning I propose two main hypotheses: 
 
H1: In states with politically excluded ethnic groups, increases in REFDI increase ethnic 
identification. 
H2: In states with politically excluded ethnic groups, increases in REFDI increase ethnic 
violence. 
 
Next I explain how these hypotheses seem to manifest in a quintessential example 
of identity-based violence over resource control, that of Nigeria's Niger Delta Region, 
and how REFDI affects social identity and fighting equilibria. 
  
Effects of REFDI in Nigeria’s Niger Delta  
Historical Background 
In understanding the effects of REFDI on ethnic conflict, it is helpful to look at 
the history of Nigeria. Due to British colonial legacies, Nigeria was created as a federalist 
state, with three major regions, Northern, Western and Eastern, populated respectively by 
the country’s three largest ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, although 
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by Nigeria’s independence, considerable population movement had occurred across 
regions and hundreds of diverse groups and languages live in Nigeria. Oil in Nigeria is 
largely concentrated in the Niger Delta regions in South-Eastern Nigeria, made up of 
Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta states, an area of about 27,000 square miles (Hallmark, 2017). 
Oil has been extracted mostly by joint ventures between MNCs and national companies 
since 1956. Since the 1960s, the existence of oil and the potential rents associated have 
raised the stakes over who controls the land and how resource rents are distributed 
throughout the country (Ukiwo, 2007). Under SS13 this could be understood as an 
increase in contestable V. 
Nigeria follows a “Derivation Principle” in distributing resource rents, whereby 
producing states get a percent of the rents from their own resources (Nwajiaku, 2005). 
Following the Biafran Civil War between (primarily) Igbo in the Eastern region and the 
Federal Government in the 1960s the state was severely weakened and new Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) for local administration were created. After the war the 
Derivation Principle was also weakened and the central government began to distribute 
less and less regional resource rents to the Niger Delta states. In the 1980s, government 
Structural Adjustment Programs also began to decrease public development efforts and 
employment.   
Simultaneously, while Shell-BP, Mobil, and other MNCs were profiting off of the 
oil from the region local tribal groups began to criticize the FDI, noting severe 
environmental and agricultural degradation and the lack of development initiatives for the 
region’s populations. Countless oil spills in the mangrove-populated region have ruined 
the productive capacity of the land for farming and fishing for decades if not centuries to 
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come. Criticisms grew into political dissent, and eventually non-violent and then violent 
actions to rest control of the region’s resources from the central government and MNCs 
(Hallmark, 2017). Notably, many of these movements have been ethnically defined. The 
first large scale movement was MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People), which, founded by famed activist Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1990, agitated for local 
control over oil resources by the Ogoni, an ethnic group indigenous to a small area of the 
Niger Delta with extreme oil extraction and environmental degradation. MOSOP engaged 
almost entirely in non-violent action however the Nigerian government 
violently repressed the movement with discriminate and indiscriminate violence 
including wide-scale murder and rape of entire communities and the execution of 
movement leaders including Saro-Wiwa himself (Mai-Bornu, 2019; Hallmark, 2017).   
The Ogoni movement (along with continued environmental degradation that left 
local communities unable to fish and farm) inspired the creation of MEND (Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta), a predominantly Ijaw group. Ijaw are also 
primarily located in the Niger Delta region, although concentrated in slightly different 
sub-regions. MEND, which united a loose confederacy of Ijaw militant groups, tried to 
force concessions by the Nigerian government and MNCs to give Ijaw control over oil on 
their land. MEND violently disrupted oil extraction, seized oil, and even held foreign 
MNC workers hostage for ransom. MEND was very successful in hindering Nigerian oil 
extraction, at one point decreasing Nigerian oil production by 500,000 barrels a day 
(Ukiwo, 2007). After successive repression and appeasement tactics by the Nigerian 
Government MEND broke up and died out. The Nigerian government co-opted some 
Ijaw leaders and militants by offering amnesty, buying weapons from them, or offering 
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security contracts to guard the oil they once plundered (Pegg, 2015). Following MEND, 
the NDA (Niger Delta Avengers), another Ijaw group, took up the mantel and through 
well-armed and well-planned attacks has at times managed to cripple Nigeria’s oil output. 
Following NDA attacks, oil output in Nigeria fell by 800,000 per day in 2016 to 1.4 
million, its lowest output in 25 years (Hallmark, 2017). The NDA agreed to a cease-fire 
with the Nigerian Government to promote peace talks, but announced an end to the 
cease-fire in November 2017, citing insincerity on the part of the national government.   
Additionally, Nigerian GDP/capita remains far below global averages, illustrated 
in the graph below using the same World Develop Indicator data: 
 
Examined from afar, a pattern emerges of local minorities excluded from central 
government control rising up in rebellion against MNC oil extraction. Meanwhile, the 
Nigerian Government violently represses action and buys off leaders until rebellion 
subsides. Afterwards, new militants emerge to continue fighting against perceived 
grievances in the names of their ethnic groups and the cycle continues.  On closer look, it 
becomes clear how social identity formation has helped mobilize fighting.  
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Social Identity Pathways 
Similarities to Scenario Two 
Certain structural elements of Nigerian politics, including its patronage and 
federalist legacies, draw certain similarities to Scenario Two in the section titled “REFDI 
Effects in Light of SS13”. Due to its federalist legacy the central government allocates 
resource rents to administrative states, which, in theory, use the money for economic 
development. In line with SS13, this provides contestable resource rents available for 
“capture” by various groups through political means. Ethnically defined groups can force 
the government to give their states more rents if they have more mobilizational capacity. 
They can do this through legal political institutions, such as electing politicians to the 
national government, or by less legal means such as corruption or violence. Due to 
its patronage legacy, representation in sub-national administrative units can determine 
how resources are allocated.  
As Nwajiaku (2017) explains, “In a political system in which patron-client 
relationships prevail as the principle channel through which "citizens" gain access to the 
state and its resources, ethnicity matters. By increasing the distributive scope of the state, 
oil has served to entrench ethnicity as a set of effective codes through which to secure 
access to net-works of patronage.” If ethnic groups lack the political power to acquire 
resource rents then they choose to fight. Applying SS13, REFDI has increased 
contestable resources held by the state, and Nigerian citizens in the relevant regions tend 
to identify ethnically, while Nigerian national status remains relatively low. 
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Additionally, at various points in Nigeria’s history sub-national administrative 
units, states, and their sub-units, LGAs, have been created or destroyed, changing which 
groups comprise majorities in these units. This can be understood as a non-violent way 
that ethnic groups compete through established political institutions for resource control, 
which at times has escalated into violence, as described in the historical overview. In 
short, after initial low national status and ethnic identification, an exogenous increase in 
contestable resources led to an equilibrium with entrenched high ethnic identification and 
high fighting efforts by ethnic groups for access to resource rents. This evidences H2.  
 
Similarities to Scenario Four 
The struggle over resource control in the Niger Delta also bears similarity to 
scenario four, where increased resources and decreased ethnic status lead to increased 
fighting among highly identifying ethnic group members and thus more ethnic 
identification. 
Part of the struggle over resource wealth has been by the Ijaw ethnic group, 
arguably the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria (Nwajiaku, 2005). Since the 1970s, 
Ijaw political leaders have tried to keep Ijaw administratively concentrated to achieve 
greater political control over oil (Ukiwo, 2007). Notably, one reason that Ijaw are 
arguably the fourth largest ethnic group is because the conception of Ijaw identity has 
changed over the last few decades in response to changing contexts. In the 1990s, various 
Ijaw elites were weakened or deposed from office, and many Ijaw interpreted this as the 
central government and other larger ethnic groups seizing power over the oil industry 
(Ukiwo, 2007). Azam (2009) notes that after resource extraction decimated local 
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economic conditions, many Ijaw migrated out of the Niger Delta region to areas where 
they could farm arable land. However, they were met with hostile responses from other 
groups, who saw them as outsiders. Attempted Ijaw emigration from Ijaw lands then 
stopped since their identity precluded them from assimilating into other groups. Here, 
under SS13, group characteristics are salient enough that many Ijaw can only identify 
with their sub-group, and thus must fight to rest control of resources. In response The 
Ijaw National Congress (INC) and the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), both created in the 
1990s organized and promoted an Ijaw ethnic nationalism. Here, the organizers of the 
INC and IYC can be viewed as highly-identifying Ijaw for whom it is hard to switch 
identities and their organization efforts can be conceptualized as extremely low level 
increases to fighting resources (as their efforts are largely peaceful). Increased Ijaw 
ethnic nationalism resulted in various Ijaw youths from different areas supporting each 
other in operations against the state and MNCs and even supporting Ijaw groups outside 
of the Niger Delta (increased ethnic Ijaw identification) (Ukiwo, 2007). Central to Ijaw 
claims were grievances that they attributed to MNCs and an uncaring Nigerian state. In 
its 1998 founding document, the Kaiama Declaration, the IYC conceptualizes their 
grievances as such: “That the quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of 
utter neglect, suppression and marginalization visited on Ijaws by the alliance of the 
Nigerian state and transnational oil companies… That the degradation of the environment 
of Ijawland by transnational oil companies and the Nigerian State arise mainly because 
Ijaw people have been robbed of their natural rights to ownership and control of their 
land and resources…” (Kaiama Declaration, 1998).   
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In April, 2019, the IYC declared that they must control local resources even if it 
means being killed, modeled as a sharp increase in fighting resources. They argue that in 
other Nigerian regions local people have been controlling resources and reaping the 
rewards so people of the Niger Delta should be able to do the same (Sahara Reporters, 
2019). This explicit “us” versus “them” argument implies a salient sub-national identity. 
Indeed, the IYC’s President, Pereotubo Oweilaemi, stated “There cannot be one Nigeria 
if everybody in the country is not treated with the same measure” (Sahara Reporters, 
2019). In this lens, REFDI in the Niger Delta clearly affects violence and social identity. 
 
MNC Involvement in Identity Formation 
While some aspects of this violence appear very similar to SS13 scenarios, MNC 
involvement (the source of REFDI), has also affected social identity formation. 
Importantly, the Ogoni conceptualized the Nigerian government and MNCs as the same 
entity, bent on extracting resources at any cost. As Pegg et al. (2015) explains, quoting 
Omeje, “…“In the minds and reckoning of a large section of the local people, there is 
hardly any distinction between the oil industry and the state. The two are perceived as 
one and the same entity” (Omeje, 2005:328). Most self-determination movements direct 
their claims solely at sovereign governments. In the Ogoni case, such claims were always 
directed both at the state and at the oil companies”.  Since MNCs and the state are so 
intertwined, identification with the nation necessitates identification with MNCs. 
Another connection between MNCs’ REFDI and ethnic conflict lies in the 
federalist system and the weakness of the Nigerian state. After Nigeria’s civil war, Shell 
and other MNCs began to negotiate terms of investment with local communities. What 
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this meant was that the smaller the community that the MNCs negotiated with the more 
narrow the MNC would have to apply development initiatives, which were commonly 
promised as part of contracts. Additionally, the smaller the community, the less resource 
rents would have to be spread across people, increasing the share per person. What this 
meant was that “host communities”, which were very small and defined by their close 
proximity to oil drilling tried to claim more bargaining rights with MNCs to obtain more 
resource rents (Nwajiaku, 2005). “Oil producing communities”, which were larger and 
included the host communities, had to legitimate their claims to rents. The INC and IYC 
did this by promoting a “pan-Ijaw ethnic nationalism”. Under this conceptualization, they 
were all Ijaw and oil on “Ijaw lands” should benefit all Ijaw (Nwajiaku, 2005). But the 
Ijaw ethnic group is not a monolith; over 40 different clans attended the Kaiama 
Declaration, and many Ijaw subgroups speak languages that are more similar to the 
languages of other major ethnic groups in Nigeria (Nwajiaku, 2005). What this means is 
that because the MNCs wanted to negotiate with as small a group as possible the pan-
Ijaw groups had to forge strong clan identities and then conceptualize them within a 
super-ordinate Ijaw identity (Nwajiaku, 2005). “So although oil, they (Ijaw Nationalists) 
argue, has not created the Ijaw nation, the struggle for ownership and more effective 
control of the revenues accru-ing from oil, has served to galvanise disparate members of 
the Ijaw ethnic community around a common plight” (Nwajiaku, 2005). The presence of 
MNCs seeking oil revenues created the need for a strong Ijaw identity for many.  This 
can be viewed through the prism of SS13:  
Let pan-Ijaw identification define a group identity called A, with heterogeneous 
identification within A. Some individuals from “host communities” choose to identify 
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differently because of the greater status they enjoy. Let host community identification be 
called H. Prior to REFDI, according to Nwajiaku (2005), there was weak conception of 
pan-Ijaw identity, and thus most people did not identify at all with A. The injection of 
REFDI (or contestable resource, V) incentivized individuals not included in H to 
construct A and claim more of V. The success of the IYC and INC in galvanizing a pan-
Ijaw identity can be interpreted as an increase in ethnic group identification. This increase 
due to increased REFDI evidences hypothesis 1. 
It is possible that without MNCs offering REFDI, this may still have happened if 
the oil producing communities needed to substantiate claims to resource wealth in order 
for local governments to allocate development projects to their areas and not just to the 
more localized host communities. In the case of Nigeria this is a moot point since MNCs 
were necessary to bring in the required capital to begin resource extraction. Considering 
all possible countries with REFDI more broadly, this type of ethnic identity 
homogenization could possibly take place without the presence of REFDI. That being 
said, without MNC involvement more local labor would be necessary for resource 
extraction. This would directly increase wealth and status to the region, mitigating 
environmental-based consequences to the economy, and decreasing the need to 
homogenize ethnic identity to gain resource wealth. Without REFDI, oil extraction is a 
local development project. Additionally, as described below, the Ogoni pushed for local 
control over resources because they argued that unlike local communities, MNCs lack 
economic incentives to prevent environmental degradation. This is a clear difference 
between the effects of MNCs’ REFDI and locally funded oil extraction. While this is not 
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empirical evidence that REFDI necessitated changes in social identity formation, it offers 
a theoretical explanation for why it might. 
It is also instructive to examine the shift from non-violent to violent actions to 
gain resource control (which constitutes an increase in fighting resources, F). Ken Saro-
Wiwa, leader of the Ogoni MOSOP, studied the movements of Gandhi and Martin Luther 
King Jr. Along with other highly educated Ogoni elites, he wrote the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights, and mobilized other Ogoni using existing religious institutions and rhetoric to 
frame and conceptualize Ogoni grievances as community based. They then demanded 
autonomy over resources on their land via non-violent demonstrations and civil 
disobedience. Notably, they pushed for control over resource rents, rather than an 
increase in the derivation principle, because they did not trust the state to maintain such 
changes later, in line with arguments by Sambanis and Milanovic (2014). Additionally, 
they argued that without local control, MNCs would lack the economic incentives to 
prevent catastrophic environmental degradation. Claims for increased autonomy over 
resources were denied, and Saro-Wiwa began an international public relations campaign 
to portray Ogoni suffering as an environmental and human rights abuse at the hands of 
the state and MNCs (Mai-Bornu, 2019). The intersection of environmental and human 
rights causes was a groundbreaking theoretical conceptualization at the time. “Saro-Wiwa 
did this by playing the “Shell card” (Bob, 2005:81) and establishing the transnational oil 
company as the vital nexus which was both directly involved in the environmental 
devastation of Ogoni (United Nations Environment Programme, 2011) and indirectly 
involved in the repression and human rights violations directed against the Ogoni through 
its support of the Nigerian military dictatorship and its request for specific forms of 
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security assistance from that dictatorship” Mai-Bornu (2019) argues that the high 
educational levels of Saro-Wiwa and his confederates allowed them to conceptualize 
their struggle with terms that resonated with an international audience, allowing and 
necessitating non-violent resistance. Around this time, small Ijaw groups were 
mobilizing, especially the youth, and beginning to create non-violent activist groups 
claiming similar autonomy on the behalf of Ijaw people. However, after the Nigerian 
state violently repressed MOSOP and slaughtered thousands of Ogoni, Ijaw groups 
became more militant, eventually uniting under MEND. Mai-Bornu (2019) argues that 
the Ijaw leaders at the time were less educated and had less recourse to non-violent 
means of resistance, necessitating violence as an only option. I argue that non-violent 
Ijaw activism in the early 1990s, as well as non-violent organization in the IYC precludes 
this argument. I argue, as Mai-Bornu (2019) also concedes, that the violent repression of 
the Ogoni movement convinced Ijaw leaders that an increase in fighting resources, F 
(from non-violent to violent) was necessary to rest control of resource distribution. Under 
SS13, I also argue that state violence increased the saliency of characteristics of ethnic 
groups in the region, making it more costly for Ijaw to identify as anything but Ijaw, 
further increasing equilibrium fighting. “The end result of this is that “Ijaw youths have 
come to realize that the only language government and oil companies understand is 
violence” (Ukiwo, 2007:609). Ikelegbe (2001) similarly notes that “violent 
confrontations have actually been last resorts of the civil groups, embarked upon because 
of the failure of peaceful methods” (459), while the International Crisis Group observes 
that militants “have learned the unfortunate lesson that violence, extortion and 
kidnapping are a way—sometimes the only way—to be taken seriously” (International 
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Crisis Group, 2006:1). Under ethnic identification SS13 predicts increased violence given 
increased contestable resources. The increasing violence taken by ethnic groups in the 
region then makes sense given the unavailability of national identification and increasing 
REFDI. 
 
Other Evidence of Identity Formation 
Oyefusi (2008) conducted a survey of male youths in the Delta and Rivers state to 
try and understand why they fight. The survey did not ask respondents why they fought, 
but rather asked respondents about their perceived and actual material and social 
conditions and if they fought or not. After regressing responses on fighting, Oyefusi 
(2008) finds material conditions can predict willingness to rebel, but that the high 
significance of self-reported Ijaw identity  “tends to lend empirical support to the close, 
sometimes inseparable, connection between grievance and greed in motivating rebellion.” 
Again, material status and willingness to commit fighting resources are dependent (and 
influence) identity. Here, identity may serve as a medium through which to interpret 
grievances. 
Finally, in establishing the connection between REFDI and conflict Terminski 
(2012) contends that some environmental degradation caused by development is not so 
bad (like making damns) because local communities eventually benefit (from access to 
productive resources, like water). Oil, by contrast, does not give these benefits. In Nigeria 
during oil field exploration the oil companies laid waste to the land because they had no 
incentive to protect its future productive capacity. Entirely state-sponsored development 
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would have had more incentive to protect the environment, but Nigeria lacks the capacity 
to sponsor such projects without REFDI from MNCs. 
In Nigeria’s Niger Delta region REFDI has increased conflict in part because of 
its effects on social identity formation. The qualitative analysis of historical contexts and 
documents evidences both hypotheses. In the next sections I examine the connections 
between REFDI, identity, and conflict with large-N statistical. 
 
Quantitative Research Design 
 In line with most quantitative research on ethnic conflict I use OLS and logistic 
regressions to explore any relationships between ethnic conflict and explanatory 
variables. I want to know the effects of REFDI on the chances of ethnic conflict, so I 
consider both the onset of new ethnic conflicts and the existence of ongoing ethnic 
conflicts as dependent variables in different analyses. In analyzing new onsets, I can see 
if REFDI increases the chances of conflict beginning when there was none previously. In 
looking at ongoing conflicts, I can see if REFDI may increase the probability of conflict 
continuing. Later I discuss potential insight from different results between onset and 
ongoing conflict. I also consider the effects of known determinants of ethnic conflict 
identified in the literature such as GDP/capita, political exclusion, population, and group 
size. When regressing new or ongoing ethnic wars on lagged REFDI (and other control 
variables), a positive and significant coefficient on lagged REFDI would evidence a 
correlation between REFDI and ethnic conflict and support hypothesis 2. While I argue 
that increasing REFDI will increase ethnic conflict because of its effects on social 
identity formation, this causal mechanism is hard to measure empirically. In a less-than-
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perfect solution, I analyze ethnic versus national identification in African countries 
compared with REFDI. A positive and significant correlation between lagged REFDI and 
ethnic identification would suggest that increasing REFDI might increase ethnic 
identification, supporting hypothesis 1. If both hypotheses are supported by the data then 
there is evidence that social identity formation may be in part responsible for some ethnic 
conflicts. I do not attempt to disprove other mechanisms nor claim that social identity 
formation necessarily causes all ethnic conflicts with REFDI. I use this data to show that 
the causal mechanisms I identify in Nigeria may also exist globally. 
 
Data 
Economic Data 
 I obtain economic data from The World Bank’s “World Development Indicators” 
(WDI, 2010). Unfortunately I could not obtain direct data on REFDI. FDI inflows are 
measured as investments from other countries and can be grouped by sectors such as 
services, manufacturing, and mining. While The World Bank offers data on FDI inflows 
by country-year and FDI inflows by sector-year, it does not offer data on FDI inflows by 
country-sector-year. One other source sells data on FDI inflows by country-sector-year 
but only for a small number of years, most of which did not match the range of years of 
my other data. As a proxy for my main explanatory variable I use data on FDI inflows by 
country-year (as a % of annual GDP) and data on each country’s Oil and Mineral Rents 
by year (as a % of annual GDP). I create an interaction term multiplying FDI and 
resource rents as a rough estimate for REFDI. Oil (mineral) rents are measured as the 
difference between the value of produced oil (minerals) at global prices and the costs of 
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production. I argue that this is a viable proxy because countries that rely heavily on 
resource rents can be expected to receive a large proportion of FDI inflows in those 
sectors. I also analyze whether groups were concentrated on land with oil production to 
try and mitigate estimation error. Of course this is not ideal data and any results from this 
analysis must be treated cautiously. I argue that any statistically significant relationship 
between the interaction of FDI and resource rents and ethnic conflict provides evidence 
that REFDI might lead to conflict, but definitely provides evidence that further research 
with better data should be pursued. All economic data ranges from 1970 through 2018 
when available. To give a sense of the increasing levels of REFDI (proxied), below is a 
graph of yearly averages across each country’s FDI (as a % of GDP) times its Oil Rents 
(as a % of GDP).  
 
  
Conflict, Oil, and Group Data 
To measure conflict, group characteristics, and oil presence I use data from Asal 
et al. (2016). They use a pairing of data from Uppsala Conflict Data Program on ethnic 
wars, Ethnic Power Relations data on geo-referenced ethnically relevant political groups 
(Cederman et al. 2010), and geo-referenced data on petroleum production from Lujala, 
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Rod, and Thieme (2007). This data is measured by country-group-year and contains 
information on whether an ethnic group began a new conflict, was already engaged in 
conflict from a previous year, was concentrated on land from which petroleum was 
produced, was excluded from state central power, recently experienced downgraded 
control of state central power, and demographic statistics. Asal et al. (2016) find that 
groups excluded from central power are more likely to engage in violence and that the 
existence of oil further increases those chances. By using this same data I can draw 
connections between economic factors, political exclusion, oil, and conflict. 
 My data set aggregates Asal’s (2016) data with the WDI data by country-year. 
Using Asal’s (2016) data I code for the total onset of ethnic wars within a country-year, 
the total ongoing ethnic wars within a country-year, the percent of a country’s population 
that is excluded from central power along ethnic group cleavages within a country-year, 
war history by country-year, as well as log GDP. I include the WDI indicators mentioned 
above by country-year as well as their single-year lagged equivalents. My data contains 
observations for years from 1970 through 2005, although many observations are missing 
data, oftentimes because countries have not existed for that whole period. The dependent 
variables in my analysis are the total onsets of ethnic wars within a country-year and the 
total ongoing ethnic wars within a country-year. I also code binary versions of the 
dependent variables, taking the value 1 if at least one new ethnic war began (or if at least 
one ethnic war was ongoing) in a country year, and 0 otherwise. By analyzing both 
cardinal and binary outcomes I can use both OLS and Logistic regressions in an attempt 
to increase robustness. 
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Identity Data 
To measure ethnic and national identity I intended to use Afrobarometer survey 
results. Afrobarometer administers rounds of surveys to diverse and representative 
populations in every African country deemed safe and open enough for reliable data 
collection. Among other questions, participants are asked if they had to pick whether 
would they identify ethnically or nationally. If ethnic identification increased in areas 
with REFDI, then that would support Hypothesis 1. Unfortunately, Afrobarometer only 
releases country level data for these questions to the public. Local geo-referenced 
responses are only available for one country at a time or one round at a time with special 
permission from the organization after an application. Admittedly, country-level data is 
not an ideal proxy for measuring changes in ethnic identification caused by REFDI. 
REFDI in one region may cause people from that region to identify ethnically, as we saw 
is the case in Nigeria, however that same REFDI may increase the status of the nation 
and incentivize other people elsewhere to identify more nationally. So the same increase 
in REFDI could have opposite effects on identification for different people that would not 
be captured by country-level averages. At the time of writing I did not have access to 
geo-referenced data from Afrobarometer, but the day before submission I was granted 
access to multiple rounds of geo-referenced data from Nigeria. Therefore I leave analysis 
of identity data to support Hypothesis 1 for an appendix that I will write in the coming 
days. The rest of this analysis deals with the relationships between economic data and 
conflict, H2. 
  
Analysis – Country-Year Data 
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 I begin examining simple correlations between economic factors and war, using 
only complete observations. The results are below: 
X Y Correlation 
Total Ethnic War Onsets FDI Inflows (% of GDP) -0.005177101 
Total Ethnic War Onsets Oil Rents (% of GDP) 0.0291064 
Total Ethnic War Onsets Mineral Rents (% of GDP) -0.01510931 
Total Ongoing EthnicWars FDI Inflows (% of GDP) -0.02115598 
Total Ongoing EthnicWars Oil Rents (% of GDP) 0.01098177 
Total Ongoing EthnicWars Mineral Rents (% of GDP) -0.05100424 
 
Essentially, there is very little correlation between ethnic war and FDI inflows, oil 
rents, and mineral rents. The negative signs on both FDI inflow correlations are 
consistent with literature that correlates increases in FDI with stability. The positive signs 
on both Oil correlations are consistent with theories of the “oil curse.” For the rest of this 
section I omit analysis of Mineral Rents because there were no statistically significant 
effects of Mineral Rents. Later I discuss why this may be the case. 
 
First I regress new ethnic wars and ongoing ethnic wars on the independent 
variables. The variables used and the outcomes are reported below. All use 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
 
Model 1: (OLS) 
Total new ethnic wars (or ongoing) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents 
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There is no significant relationship between the explanatory variable and the 
outcome for either new onsets or ongoing. Clearly REFDI cannot explain ethnic conflict 
alone. 
 
Model 2: (Logistic) 
New ethnic war (or ongoing) (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil 
Rents 
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Here I regress on the existence of at least one new ethnic war onset (or one 
ongoing) using a logistic regression. Again, these results show that REFDI alone cannot 
explain ethnic conflict. Results from using lagged WDI variables are similar and not 
reported here. Next, I include all of the country level variables used in Asal et al. (2016): 
 
Model 3: (OLS) 
Total new ethnic wars (or ongoing) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents 
+ percent of population excluded + log GDP/capita (lagged) + history of war  
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When regressing on total ongoing wars the interaction between FDI inflows and 
Oil rents becomes statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient is tiny. Although log population size (lagged) was not 
significant in Asal et al.’s analysis I include it here because it is significant. Next I run 
logistic regressions on the binary versions of the dependent variables using the same 
explanatory variables. 
 
Model 4: (Logistic) 
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Onset (or ongoing) (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents + 
percent of population excluded + log GDP/capita (lagged) + history of war + log 
population (lagged) 
 
Again, the interaction term is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, but 
only for ongoing conflicts and not onsets. 
 
Model 5: Country Fixed Effects 
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Finally I run the same OLS regression as in Model 3, but with country Fixed 
Effects to partially account for endogeneity concerns (discussed later).  
Total new ethnic wars (or ongoing) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents 
+ percent of population excluded + log GDP/capita (lagged) + history of war + Country 
Fixed Effects 
 
I do not report the individual coefficient estimates for every country, but do report 
the coefficient estimates for the other explanatory variables.  
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The coefficient on the interaction term for REFDI remains statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level. 
 
Analysis of Interaction Terms 
Since I am using the multiplicative interaction term of FDI inflows and Oil rents 
to proxy REFDI levels, I cannot interpret the interaction term’s coefficient as an 
unconditional marginal effect of REFDI on the chances of conflict. Rather, as both FDI 
inflows and Oil increase, the chances of ethnic conflict increase. In line with 
recommendations by Hainmueller et al. (2019) and Brambor et al. (2006) on analyzing 
interaction terms, I report plots of the interaction terms from the raw data and kernel 
density estimations of the pdf of the outcomes for differing levels of the interaction 
terms.  
 
Below is a plot of the interaction terms and outcome variable total number of 
ongoing wars created using “interflex” code from Hainmueller et al. (2019). “Treatment” 
on the x-axis reports Oil rents (% GDP), plotted against the number of ongoing wars. 
Each of the three graphs reports these relationships for low, medium, and high levels of 
FDI respectively. The blue line is a linear regression, while the red is a LOESS fit. 
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While the effects look very small, it is clear that the effects of oil rents change 
depending on levels of FDI inflows. Only at high levels of FDI do increases in oil rents 
increase the chances of conflict. This is expected given that I am attempting to proxy 
REFDI with the interaction term. I am assuming that high levels of REFDI (in the oil 
sector) correlate with high levels of FDI and oil rents, so low levels of either oil rents or 
FDI imply low levels of REFDI. For low levels of FDI, I don’t necessarily care about the 
effect of the interaction treatment. 
 
Next I report a graph of the kernel estimates and the bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals for the marginal effects of oil rents in predicting the number of ongoing wars for 
varying levels of FDI (controlling for GDP/capita and exclusion): 
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Here we see that for levels of FDI inflows ranging from just above 0% to about 30% of 
GDP, increasing Oil rents increase the probability of an ongoing war. While this appears 
to contradict the raw plot above, it should be noted that the third raw plot graph with the 
largest levels of FDI, the only graph that showed a positive relationship between the 
treatment and outcome variables, begins at FDI levels of roughly 2% of GDP. This is 
about the same level of FDI where marginal oil rent increases begin to show a positive 
effect on the outcome variable.  
It should be noted, however, that the marginal effects as well as any statistically 
significant coefficient estimates in the regressions are very small, less than 0.05. While 
most quantitative analyses of ethnic conflict report small effects this is still relatively 
small. Below is the same graph with outcome equal to the number of new ethnic 
conflicts. While the kernel estimate becomes more linear, the confidence intervals 
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become so large that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no multiplicative 
interaction effect for most levels of FDI inflows. 
 
 
Mineral Rents? 
As noted, any effects of FDI and oil rents were not seen for FDI and mineral 
rents. The question then, is why? I argue that there may be structural differences between 
the oil industry and the mining industry. For one, Oil investments can only benefit local 
communities with the rents and compensation that they produce. As is the case in 
Nigeria, if that compensation never happens then the communities never benefit. As is 
also the case in Nigeria, bargaining over compensation forces judgments on who deserves 
compensation, which can be decided based on identity. Unlike oil, mineral investment 
poses the opportunity to create job growth. Oil production requires high skilled workers 
and many MNCs bring in foreign workers. Mining, however, does not require the same 
share of high skilled workers and so economic benefits may be shared more equitably 
among indigenous populations. Additionally, mining does not render neighboring land 
unproductive in the same way that oil drilling does after spills. If there are less grievances 
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and less bargaining over compensation under mining investments then there may be less 
reason to identify ethnically after mining foreign investments. 
 Aside from structural differences between oil and mining, the lack of explicit data 
on mining FDI inflows may also limit results. Empirically, mining rents account for far 
less than oil rents as a percent of GDP. On average, oil rents as a percent of GDP by 
country-year are 4.89 times higher than that of mineral rents in the dataset. Average 
yearly oil rents (% GDP) are 4.91 times higher than that of mineral rents. Given the low 
levels of mineral rents, mineral rents (% of GDP) times FDI inflows may be a poor proxy 
for Mining FDI. The graph below illustrates the low levels of mining rents in the data set 
compared to FDI and oil rents: 
 
 As such, more research about the differences between the effects of mining and 
oil on host communities and more precise data on FDI inflows by country-industry is 
required to make any substantive claims.  
 
Analysis – Country-Group-Year Data 
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 The results from analyzing Country-Year data were not impressive, although 
hinted at possible relationships between REFDI and conflict. In order to assess the results 
better, I also import the country-year WDI data into Asal et al.’s (2016) country-group-
year data. Now I can see how country-level FDI inflows and oil rents affect the chances 
of rebellion when there exists oil production within a given group’s region. I can now 
also incorporate group-level variables. Groups that recently experienced a downgrade in 
political power are coded as well as (log) group size.  Positive coefficients in these 
regressions further evidence a possible connection between REFDI and ethnic conflict. 
Since Asal et al.’s (2016) data codes binary variables for new ethnic conflict onsets I use 
logistic regressions.  
 
Model 6: (Logistic) 
New ethnic war (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents 
 
Here we see that there are positive and statistically significant multiplicative interaction 
effects between FDI and Oil on the chances of war. However, after including other 
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explanatory variables used by Asal et al. (2016) the relationship becomes statistically 
significant at only the 90% confidence level: 
 
Model 7: (Logistic) 
New ethnic war (binary) ~ FDI Inflows + Oil Rents + FDI Inflows*Oil Rents 
+ excluded + downgraded + log group size + log population (lagged) + log GDP/capita 
(lagged) + Presence of petroleum production + war history 
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The results from this regression imply that we cannot reject the null that FDI inflows and 
oil rents have no effect on the chances for ethnic conflict onset. Nevertheless, the mixed 
results from all of the regressions imply that there still may be a connection and 
Hypothesis 2 may still hold. 
 
Analysis – Endogeneity Concerns 
 As noted, there exists a demonstrated negative correlation between war and FDI 
and numerous studies show a causal connection from war to decreasing FDI. This makes 
sense considering MNCs would not invest if they expect war to create negative returns on 
investment. However, I am trying to observe any causal connections moving in the 
opposite direction. Of course, then, endogeneity is a concern. Given the established 
causal connection between war and less FDI, any positive effects of REFDI in these 
regressions on war would be biased downwards and should be interpreted as lower 
bounds.  
As shown above, Model 5 also includes country fixed effects to partially account 
for endogeneity. Countries with high FDI one year are likely to experience high FDI the 
next all else equal since MNCs aim to make rational risk assessments year after year. 
Using FE helps include this in the model leaving other explanatory variables to account 
for exogenous shocks. 
Additionally, in most regressions FDI inflows alone were negatively correlated 
with conflict (as expected), but the interaction term was positive. If the interaction term is 
an acceptable proxy for REFDI then this implies that for most forms of FDI war 
correlates with lower FDI, but not necessarily for REFDI. This may be because resource 
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extractionary MNCs can still receive positive returns on investment during ethnic conflict 
and so are not as deterred by political instability. Or, it is because REFDI increases the 
chances of ethnic conflict beyond MNC’s risk assessments. The stronger positive 
relationship between REFDI (proxied) and the existence of ongoing war versus the onset 
of new ethnic conflict evidences the latter relationship.  
The difference between conflict onset and ongoing conflict existence also helps 
evidence effects of REFDI. Assuming that the existence of violence increases the known 
investment risk we would expect REFDI to decrease with ongoing conflict more so than 
new conflict. The fact that REFDI correlates more positively with ongoing war suggests 
that REFDI may exacerbate war. If there only existed a causal connection from war to 
reduced REFDI then we would not see investments during ongoing wars.  
 
Conclusion 
 The findings presented in the study are mixed. In the qualitative analysis of 
Nigeria as a case study I show that REFDI has led to increased ethnic identification 
among the Ijaw and Ogoni in the Niger Delta region that has led to increased violence. 
Using SS13 as an initial framework I argue that REFDI constitutes increases to 
contestable resources in Nigeria that incentivize less national identification and greater 
ethnic identification. I also argue that the Nigerian government’s response has further 
exacerbated tensions and led to increased violence. 
The theoretical expectations of the model and Nigerian case study predict a 
positive relationship between REFDI and ethnic conflict. The evidence from the 
quantitative analysis, however, does not allow us to reject the null hypotheses that REFDI 
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as no effect on ethnic conflict. Any effects of the proxy I use for REFDI in the models are 
weak if statistically significant at all. The evidence does, however, suggest that there still 
may be a connection between REFDI, social identity formation, and ethnic conflict as I 
argue there exists in Nigeria, especially considering that political instability decreases 
FDI and creates a downward bias on the coefficient estimates for REFDI. 
This study is limited in its approach due to the lack of quantitative data on FDI by 
country-sector-year, and by the until-recent lack of data on localized identity. As is, 
regression models in the literature tend to report little explanatory power in general for 
evidencing causal mechanisms, so the quantitative analysis here is intended more to 
evidence the possibility of a causal relationship that I argue is apparent in the qualitative 
analysis. 
In order to more adequately assess these relationships further qualitative research 
must be done in different countries and further qualitative research with localized surveys 
should be used to see if oil production and/or REFDI correlates with stronger ethnic 
identity and actual data on FDI inflows by sector-country-year should be used instead of 
proxies. In the upcoming days I intend to use the new localized identity data in Nigeria to 
see if the Niger Delta region, the area with the most REFDI and petroleum extraction also 
has exhibited an increase in ethnic identification, as the theoretical expectations of the 
model imply. I will include any results in a future appendix. 
Aside from evidencing the need for more specific data, I argue that FDI may pose 
hidden challenges for countries with heterogeneous identification. These states as well as 
MNCs and the international community must be acutely aware of these challenges. 
Policy should aim to limit the harm of REFDI to local communities and harness the 
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wealth brought by REFDI for community development with fair wealth distribution to 
incentivize a strong national identification. The relationships and causal mechanisms 
relating to ethnic conflict, resource extraction, and foreign investment have only just 
begun to be understood and I hope that this research highlights gaps in our knowledge 
and offers possible answers. 
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